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Are court-appointed experCs
the soluiaion to the problems
of expert testimony1
In Texas, court-appointed experts
are frequently used in family law cases,
providing a rare opportunity
to examine how such a system works.
by Anthony Champagne, Danny Easterling,
Daniel W. Shuman,Alan Tomkins, Elizabeth Whitaker

I

n contrast with the legal systems
of many other countries, the use
of privately-retained experts is
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the dominant method for presenting
expert testimony in the U.S, I but the
use of privately-retained rather than
court-appointed experts has been
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the subject of intense criticism. Critics argue that privately-retained experts bias the information provided
to courts because attorneys shop for
experts who will present their point
of view in the most favorable light,
even though that point of view may
not be the mainstream scientific one
or appropriately reflect the consensus of technical or specialized knowledge. 2 Others argue that the use of
retained experts permits non-mainstream perspectives to be brought
1. Di Lello, Note, Fighting Fire with Firefighters:
A Proposal for Expert judges at the Trial Level, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 473,474 (1993). For an overview
of expert testimony issues in a variety of legal
contexts, see Faigman et al. eds., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF SCIENCE
AND EXPERT TESTIMONY (1997); REFERENCE MANUAL
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2d ed. Federal Judicial
Center 2000). See also Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983
(1999). Erichson's article includes a useful
comparison of expert evidence in the U.S. with
the inquisitorial "legal systems of Germany,
France, Italy, Brazil, Chile, South Korea, Egypt,
and other civil law countries throughout continental Europe, Latin America and elsewhere"
(citations omitted).
2. Monahan & Walker, Social Science Research
in Law: A New Paradigm, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOCIST
465 (1988) ("[l]awyers sometimes cynically
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pick and choose among studies and experts until
they find one with conclusions to their liking").
3. See, e.g., Black et aI., Science and the Law in the
Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REv. 715 (1994); Saks, Expert Witnesses, Nonexpert Witnesses, and Nonwitness Experts,
14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291 (1990).
4. See, e.g., Murphy, Note, Experts, Liars, and
Guns for Hire: A Different Perspective on the Qualifications of Technical Expert Witnesses, 69 IND. LJ. 637
(1994) .

RICHARD LAURENT

5. E.g., Albers et al., Toward a Model Expert Witness Act: An Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses and a Proposal for Reform, 80 IOWA L. REV.
1269, 1276 (1995) ("A major problem that arises
when experts are used as advocates in the
adversarial process is that conflicting pressures
cause experts to slant their testimony ... ").
6. E.g., Washburn, Testimony ofExperts, 1 AM. L.
REv. 45, 61-62 (1866); Foster, Expert TestimonyPrevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies, 11
HARv. L. REV. 169 (1897); Hand, Historical and
Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
15 HARV. L. REv. 40, 56 (1901); Friedman, Expert
Testimony, Its Abuse and Reform, 19 YALE LJ. 247
(1910); Prettyman, Needed: A New Trial Technique,
34 A.B.A.]. 766, 769-70 (1948); For a recent overview, see Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses:
Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and Deference, 77 OR.
L. REv. 59, 64-74 (1998).

into court and gives judges little control over its introduction,3 and that
privately-retained experts can be ex7. FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee's note
(1972) ( "experience indicates that actual appointment is a relatively infrequent occurrenee"). See generally Cecil and Willging, Court-Appointed Experts, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 525 (Federal Judicial Center, 1994). See
also Cecil and Willging, The Use of Court-Appointed
Experts in Federal Courts, 78 JUDICATURE 41 (1994).
8. See, e.g., Carnegie Commission on Science,
Technology, and Government, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGYIN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND MEETING CHALLENGES 37 (March, 1993)
('The present system authorizes the court to appoint experts to provide assistance, but courts have
rarely availed themselves of this opportunity") .
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pensive, since it is likely
there will be a "battle of the
experts. "4 Finally, critics argue that privately-retained
experts can easily lose their
objectivity since even competent experts feel pressure to accommodate their
views to their attorney-employers. 5
For at least a century, these
critics have argued in favor of courtappointed experts. 6 Although there
have been criticisms of these proposals, arguing that juries may be lulled
into a false sense of security about
court-appointed experts' competence and objectivity, proposals for
the use of court-appointed experts
abound. Yet the use of court-appointed experts has been the subject
of little study.7 Moreover, notwithstanding courts' express or inherent
authority to appoint experts8 and the
enthusiasm expressed in favor of
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court-appointed experts, in most
American civil and criminal settings
the use of court-appointed experts is
exceptional. 9
However, one area of law-family
law-makes use of court appointments even in non-exceptional circumstances,IO although use varies
across jurisdictions. l l In Texas,
court-appointed experts are frequently used in family law cases
where there is a child custody dispute. In these cases, judges will appoint an expert, often a psychologist, to examine the parties. Of
course, lawyers for both sides may
examine the expert and also present
privately-retained experts. However,
unlike other areas of practice where
the judge's power to appoint experts
is unexercised, in Texas family law
cases, at least in counties in which
those experts exist, judges routinely
appoint experts. Thus, these cases
provide a rare opportunity to study
the operation of a system that relies
extensively on court-appointed experts and to assess the claims of its
superiority to the use of retained experts.
Unlike other jurisdictions, family
law cases can be heard by a jury in
Texas. Thus, the family law practices
described below are possibly germane primarily to Texas. Despite this
unique situation, we believe the use
of court-appointed experts in Texas
is instructive regarding the potential
usefulness of court appointments of
experts in general.

cus groups would permit us to ex- judges. The Dallas County focus
plore more extensively the partici- groups included 12 board certified
pants' reactions to an operating, family lawyers, four experts, and
court-appointed expert system.
eight family district judges and assoDallas and Tarrant (Ft. Worth) ciate judges. Thus, our final sample
counties are both large metropolitan of 37 was comprised of 17 lawyers, 8
centers in north Texas, although they experts, and 12 family district court
are grounded in vastly different legal judges and associate judges.
cultures. The smaller of the counties
is Tarrant, which continues to main- The experts
tain something of a small town cul- With no dissent, the experts enthusiture. For the most part, the family astically supported the use of courtlawyers, experts, and judges know appointed experts in the family law
one another. As a result, there is arena. Indeed, although all of them
more of a spirit of cooperation and were willing to be retained as nonaccommodation in Tarrant County testifying consulting experts, most
than in Dallas County, where there is were unwilling to work as privatelygreater anonymity.
retained testifying experts. One of
We invited board-certified family the reasons experts expressed for falawyers l2 in Dallas and Tarrant coun- voring court appointment over prities, psychologists who regularly vate retention is that court-apserved as court-appointed experts, pointed experts have access to both
and the judges and associate judges parents and children in a custody
serving in the family district courts, to dispute, which retained experts
participate in our focus groups.13 The rarely enjoy in Texas. The experts
focus groups, then, were comprised believed that without access to both
of self-selected participants.
sides they were unable to render satThe lawyers, judges, and experts isfactory opinions and that testifrom each county were interviewed mony without access to both sides
in separate groups to prevent one was ethically problematic. Indeed, at
occupational or geographic group least in rendering an opinion about
from biasing the responses of an- the best interests of a child, the
other. We identified the experts by American Psychological Association
preliminary interviews of family dis- Child Custody Guidelines caution
trict court judges to learn which against a comparative assessment in
ones are regularly court appointed. the absence of access to all of the
The Tarrant County focus groups in- parties. 14 Relatedly, the experts had
cluded five board certified family personal liability concerns, believlawyers, four experts, and four fam- ing that they were exposed to liabilily district court and associate ity if they were privately retained,

Methodology
To explore how the court-appointment process operates and to examine various perspectives on its operation, we conducted focus groups with
family district court judges, board
certified family lawyers, and court-appointed experts from Dallas and
Tarrant counties, Texas. We were
concerned that a questionnaire
would not provide information that
was qualitatively as rich as the focus
groups both because the number of
experts and judges was small and because the number of contested custody cases that reach trial each year is
also small. We anticipated that the fo-
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9. Cecil and Willging, COURT-ApPOINTED ExPERTS: DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED
UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 706 (FederaIJudicial Center, 1993); Champagne, et aI., The Problem with Empirical Examination of the Use of CourtAppointed Experts: A Report of Non-findings, 14 BEH.
SCI. & LAw 361 (1996); But see, e.g., Scott and
Anderson, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Proposed Implementation of the Guidelines ofDaubert and
Landrigan under the Newly Adopted New Jersey Rules
of Evidence, 20 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.j. 1,
54-56 (1994): "Court-appointed experts have
been used regularly in certain areas of the law in
New Jersey. They have been used in matters such
as worker's compensation, competency, attorney
discipline, and paternity proceedings.
Court-appointed experts have also been used for
valuation of stock, in land condemnation proceedings, and for valuation of land in land swap
deals. Independent experts are also used extensively in the family law context, in divorce, alimony, custody, and support cases, in addition to
paternity situations." (citations omitted).
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The use of court-appointed experts is regularly
used throughout Europe and other inquisitorialbased legal jurisdictions throughout the world.
See, e.g., Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil
Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985) (arguing
Germany's tradition of making extensive use of
court-appointed rather than party-retained experts shows the advantages of these practices).
10. See, e.g., Scott and Anderson, supra n. 9, at 56.
11. Compare Note, Mcburney, Bitter Battles: The
Use ofPsychological Evaluations in Child Custody Disputes in West Virginia, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 773, 789
(1995) (only 9 of 14 family law masters interviewed in West Virginia had ever appointed an
expert to conduct a custody evaluation) with
Herman and Sullivan, Court-Appointed Experts in
Child Custody Cases, N.Y.L.j., June 30, 1997, at 7
"Although a court is not required to appoint an
independent psychological expert to investigate
the background and psychological makeup of
the litigants and their children in every case,
such an appointment is generally required where
there are serious issues of parental fitness," citing

but enjoyed immunity if they were
court appointed.
The experts believed court appointment deprived the attorneys of
control over them, resulting in
greater professional independence.
They believed that as privately-retained experts there was always an element of distrust toward
them; they admitted that
there were some experts
whose testimony could be
and was purchased by attorneys. As a court-appointed expert they perceived that there seemed
to be less of a question of
their integrity. And, they
noted, if they were court
appointed, attorneys had
a sense that the judge had
endorsed (or at least
would listen seriously to)
their views.
The experts suggested
that the use of court-appointed experts did not invariably reduce the costs of a custody dispute as
cases that proceeded to trial invariably involved both retained and appointed experts. In these cases the
use of court-appointed experts increased the costs of experts. However, when the parents had limited
resources, court-appointed experts
often reduced the costs of litigation
because the court-appointed expert's
report served as a template for settlement negotiations. This was a significant advantage to parties who were
unable to afford their own experts.
It is understandable why these experts preferred to serve as court-appointed rather than retained experts
in family law cases. They believed

that as court-appointed experts they
were less likely to be subject to suit,
enjoyed greater access to relevant information, and were unlikely to be
treated as a hired gun. Indeed, some
experts suggested that court appointment cast them in the role of decision makers as contrasted with the

The experts believed

pointed experts and maintained
that the best experts were the ones
the lawyers retained. They asserted
that there were only a half dozen
competent court-appointed experts. "Real experts," they argued,
"work for lawyers." They believed
that court-appointed experts could
not succeed in private
practice, or were inexperienced and just beginning a practice and
consequently needed to
rely on court appointments.
In addition to concerns about quality with
the use of court-appoin ted experts, both
Tarrant and Dallas
county lawyers believed
that they lose some control over a case with
court-appointed experts
who are independent
and who have the approval of the judge. But it was not
simply that a privately-retained arrangement, unlike court appointment, makes the expert beholden to
the lawyer. Lawyers feared that they
would be surprised at trial with a
court-appointed expert because they
had less chance to communicate with
the expert prior to trial. In addition,
they were less able to control the direction of the court-appointed
expert's testimony and, unlike privately-retained experts, when the
court-appointed expert was favorable
to their side, they could not prepare
the expert for the rigors of cross-examination.
Additionally, lawyers pointed out
that privately-retained experts could
help them with the case in other
ways. As one lawyer put it, "When
something is weak about the case, a
retained expert can 'sniff it out.'"
Since a court-appointed expert is not
allied with a lawyer, (s)he cannot be
relied on to suggest problems and avenues for exploration in a case to
counsel.
Most, but not all of the lawyers we
spoke with in Dallas and Tarrant
counties, had some cases where
money was no object, where there

court appointment deprived
the attorneys of control
over them, resulting

in greater professional

Vernon Me. v. Brenda N., 196 A.D.2d 823, 825 (2d
Dept. 1993); Giraldo v. Giraldo, 85 A.D.2d 164,
171 (1st Dept. 1982), appeal dismissed, 56
N.Y.2d 804 (1982). The reason for the variation
in practice probably reflects the differing no·
tions regarding the usefulness of court-appointed evaluations in custody disputes.
12. The Texas Board of Legal Specialization
offers certification, authorized by the Supreme
Court of Texas, in 17 areas oflaw, including family law. Certification is not a requirement of
practice but is intended to help the public learn
about the experience and education of attorneys
who are certified in a specialty.
13. Family district courts, which exist in urban
areas including Dallas and Ft. Worth, are special-

independence.

role of mere witnesses when they
were retained. Some experts did suggest, however, that court appointment exacted greater responsibility
because they were obliged to present
the entire story in a balanced fashion, rather than just the point of view
of one side.

The lawyers
The lawyers offered a different assessment of the use of retained versus
appointed experts in family law cases,
expressing a marked preference for
retained experts. The lawyers buttressed their preference with several
observations.
The Dallas County lawyers were
critical of the quality of court-ap-

ized courts empowered to hear "(1) adoptions;
(2) birth records; (3) divorce and marriage annulment; (4) child welfare, custody, support and
reciprocal support, dependency, neglect, and delinquency; (5) parent and child; and (6) husband and wife." Tex. Gov't Code §§ 24.601
(1999). Texas law permits a county to authorize a
family district court judge to appoint an associate
judge to hear "any aspect" of a suit over which the
family court has jurisdiction, subject to the right
of a party to object to an associate judge hearing
a trial on the merits. Tex. Fam. Code §§ 201.005
(1999).
14. American Psychological Assn., Guidelines
for Child Custody Evaluations in Divorce Proceedings,
49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 677 (1994).
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were essentially unlimited funds
available. But all the lawyers emphasized that high-dollar cases were rare
and that, for the most part, lawyers
had to operate within a budget. If,
one lawyer suggested, there was
$30,000 available for a case, a courtappointed expert could cut a large
sum from the budget, perhaps
$5,000. That left considerably less for
hiring retained experts and for a sufficient fee for the lawyers. Still, the Ft.
Worth lawyers, in particular, emphasized that perhaps 80 percent of their
cases had major financial constraints,
and for these cases, it might be possible for a court-appointed expert to
work for as little as $2,500. In contrast, it was typical for retained experts to cost as much as $10,000 to
$50,000. In fact, in some rare cases
retained experts might cost
$100,000.
Court-appointed experts, it seems,
were the poor litigants' experts, even
though poorer persons- the bottom
80 percent-might think that the
cost of the court-appointed expert is
not trivial. Still, the lawyers had a
strong preference for privately-retained experts. As one lawyer put it,
"Trying a custody case without an expert is like taking a knife to a gunfight." If there was to be a court-appointed expert, the lawyers thought
that it was likely, if it was affordable,
for there to also be at least one retained expert on each side.
The lawyers also believed that psychological testimony in custody cases
was a highly subjective process. One
lawyer described it as "soft science."
Additionally, contested custody cases
were overwhelmingly close cases that
might easily go either way, even
though they were also highly emotional cases where, unlike property
disputes, there was little or no room
for compromise. In these cases, "refined advocacy" was necessary and a
court-appointed expert simply did
not help to promote an adversarial
outcome.
Because Texas judges are elected
in partisan elections, we assumed
that family district court judges
would be especially sensitive to the
concerns of family lawyers, if only to

182 Judicature

cultivate their support in election
campaigns. If family lawyers were
strongly opposed to the use of courtappointed experts, we assumed the
judges would be responsive to their
concerns and reduce or eliminate
court appointments. Interestingly,
however, the Ft. Worth lawyers did
not believe that partisan election of
judges had any effect on the use of
appointed experts. The Dallas
County lawyers felt even more
strongly that family court judges in
Dallas County would not respond to
lawyer hostility to court appointment
of experts. In their view, family lawyers were not the main constituency
of judges. Rather, they argued that as
Dallas has become increasingly Republican, Dallas County judges need
only worry about receiving the Republican nomination and that nomination had no relationship to the
views of family lawyers.

nation of court-appointed experts
could sometimes be intense because
a special effort had to be made to
make apparent their bias to the court
and to the jury.
Both the Dallas and Ft. Worth
judges tried to obtain the cooperation of attorneys by allowing them to
select the court-appointed expert. If
the attorneys could not agree on an
expert or if the judge was not satisfied with the expert, the judge would
sometimes provide a list of possibilities from which the attorneys could
choose. This method did not give attorneys control over the expert, but it
offered them a role in the selection
process. As the lawyers tended to be
hostile to the idea of court appointment, this selection mechanism offered to reduce the opposition of the
lawyers. Payment of the expert would
then come from the marital estate,
although the experts stressed that
obtaining payment was sometimes a
The judges
struggle and that the judges could
Not surprisingly, the judges respon- not be depended on to assist the exsible for appointing experts found perts. Along with the experts and the
little problem with court appoint- attorneys, the judges noted that if the
ment. Judges claim they use court-ap- money was available, lawyers would
pointed experts to minimize bias. also present privately-retained exThey assume that since the experts perts. However, most cases involved
are court appointed, they do not limited resources, so the court-aphave a hidden agenda. And, claim pointed expert was likely the only exthe judges, if experts do show bias, pert.
they will not be reappointed. In Ft.
Worth, the judges say that there are A mixed picture
four or five experts who regularly Although family law cases present a
tend to be used as court-appointed unique opportunity to examine the
experts. In Dallas, of course, there use of court-appointed experts in the
are more. In both jurisdictions, the American legal system, it is important
judges tend to believe that a court- to be cautious in generalizing from
appointed system encourages objec- these cases to their use across the letivity, which helps to achieve their gal system. Family law cases have
goal of obtaining neutral informa- transformed the adversary system for
many reasons, not the least of which
tion.
The Dallas judges saw an advan- is the concern that unabated
tage in that court-appointed experts adversarialness may be harmful to
would get to interview all sides and children. In addition, at least in the
thus they would tend to have a better two counties studied, retained exsense of the custody situation. On the perts have not generally been permitother hand, the Dallas judges did ted to examine both parents and chilworry that court-appointed experts dren in custody/visitation disputes,
might get too much respect and which is a predicate for a competent
might learn the biases of judges and comparative assessment. Thus, apart
try to please the judges too much. from generic critiques about the use
However, both the Dallas and Ft. of retained experts, these family law
Worth judges noted that cross-exami- cases may present a special set of cir-
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cumstances compelling the use of
court-appointed experts not present
in many other types of cases.
Court-appointed experts have
been used rarely in the civil or criminal justice system in America, but in
Texas they are commonly used in
family law cases. Thus, while we intend to expand our examination of the use of
court-appointed experts
to other jurisdictions,
Texas family law cases
presented a unique opportunity for this pilot
study. What emerges
from our discussions with
experts, lawyers, and
judges who work in this
highly emotional area in
Dallas and Tarrant counties is a mixed picture.
Lawyers are concerned
they lose control of the process when
court-appointed experts are used.
Their access to court-appointed experts is far less than their access to
privately-retained experts. In addition, they are unable to prepare
court-appointed experts for testimony or for cross-examination and
they cannot use the court-appointed
expert for guidance in directing their
case.
Court-appointed experts are commonly used exclusively when the case
is low budget, but if money is available, lawyers much prefer also hiring
privately-retained experts. They fear
that the court-appointed expert will
receive too much respect from the
judge or jury, although judges note
that they have seen court-appointed
experts rigorously attacked in crossexamination. Additionally, at least
the Dallas lawyers believe that many
of the court-appointed experts lack
sufficient competence.
Although the lawyers bemoan the
loss of control over the expert, the
experts enjoy the independence they
get from court appointment. Not beholden to lawyers, they perceive that
they also are immune from civil law-

suits because of their testimony.
Their comfort with the court-appointment system is very high.
Judges are primarily concerned
that court appointment provides
them with a neutral opinion by an
expert in an intensely difficult and
emotional area of law. For Texas's

expert has reached a conclusion,
having interviewed both parties.
However, it is not necessarily the
case that costs are reduced by the
use of court-appointed experts. If
money is available, privately-retained experts will be used, either in
a testifying capacity, in a consulting
capacity, or both.
Finally, when an
expert is court appointed, there is at
least an aura of neutrality about the expert.
Court-appointed experts also interview
both parents and thus
will have more complete information on
which to base a conclusion. It is a position
that is much more appealing professionally
for the expert witness. However, because there is little rigorous science
underpinning most expert custody
or visitation recommendations1S, the
aura of neutrality and objectivity of
court-appointed experts is troubling.
Despite complaints from the bar,
the judges and experts we spoke to
had a favorable impression of the
use of court-appointed experts. But
these impressions cannot substantiate the claim that the use of courtappointed experts is superior to the
use of retained experts. Moreover,
we do not know if the satisfaction
expressed by judges and experts is
generalizable to other judges and
experts in Dallas and Ft. Worth,
much less the rest of Texas. Even
conceding that court appointment
of experts in Texas family courts is
working well, it is nonetheless unclear whether other case types will
so easily permit the routine use of
court-appointed experts. Nor is it
clear whether it would be easy to establish elsewhere the kind of legal
culture present in the Texas family
court context that apparently appreciates the advantages of the
regular use of court-appointed experts. 4)1~

For judges, there appear
to be no barriers to court
appointment of experts and
few downsides for doing so.

15. Krauss and Sales, Legal Standards, Expertise,
and Experts in the Resolution of Contested Child Custody Cases, 6 PSYCHOL., PUB POL'y & L. (2000)
(forthcoming) .

family court judges, who have been
immersed in a legal culture that
uses court appointment of experts,
there appear to be no barriers to appointment and few downsides for
doing so.
In short, the evaluations of court
appointment of experts depends on
one's role in the process. Nonetheless, several points emerge from our
focus groups. These are the considerations of control, cost, and neutrality,
which find their echo in the larger
debate about the use of court-appointed experts.
Within the adversarial system, it is
normally accepted that lawyers control the presentation of facts before
the judge and jury, but that is lost
with court-appointed experts. The
experts are largely free of the lawyers' control and have, at the minimum, the aura of the judges' imprimatur in their testimony. Although
they may be subject to harsh cross-examination, they are far more free
agents than are privately-retained experts.
In low-budget custody cases,
which are most of those in Dallas
and Ft. Worth, limited resources
may require that only the court-appointed expert is presented. Indeed,
settlement may sometimes be encouraged where a court-appointed
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